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The public and political furore over the police response at 
Sydney airport in late March, 2009 to the bashing death on 
of an associate of the Hells Angels bikie gang highlighted 
once again our false faith in systems, institutions and 
structures, and our misguided belief that somebody else 
will step in to protect us in times of trouble. 
On the day of the brawl at Sydney Airport, passengers 
assumed that security would stop the melee; private 
security staff assumed that the Australian Federal 
Police (AFP) would stop the melee; the AFP assumed 
that the public or airport security would alert them 
to the melee via the emergency triple 0 number; 
and everybody assumed that something everyone 
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seemed to refer to as 'increased airport security' would 
come to the rescue. But in reality, no-one was able 
to take complete responsibility. This event highlights 
the weaknesses of seemingly rational management 
systems, and particularly, the danger that arises when 
we over-rely on these systems to manage our lives. 
As well as being a useful and efficient means to 
manage resources, provide a degree of certainty, and 
solve broad organisational and societal problems, 
management systems also have the effect of removing 
creativity, community and autonomy from citizens in 
the interests of efficiency and responsibility for the 
greatest possible part of the structure. 
Phifosopher John Ralston-Saul describes the dominant --~ 
power system in the West as being Platonist, '[a] 
system, which functions on highly developed levels 
of structure and law-[a] school of pure rationality 
and fear of the undefined and doubt'. These rational 
systems take on a form of homeostasis, in that they 
regulate their internal environment and attempt to 
maintain a stable and constant condition by restricting 
the inAuence of external forces. This internal focus 
also means that systems are unable to communicate 
with other systems because protecting the integrity of 
the system is a critical component of its efficiency. To 
some degree, the systems are so internally focused and 
structured that they are unable to adapt to variables 
that are not input into the system. 
There are clear parallels to how the security system 
responded to the incident at Sydney Airport in the 
response to Black Saturday bushfires in Victoria, the US 
government response to Hurricane Katrina in 2005 and 
even in the origins of the global financial crisis. 
In many areas affected by the tragic Victorian bushfires, 
residents who wanted to create clearings around their 
homes were prevented from doing so by laws that 
had no flexibility for individual council representatives 
or owners of properties to believe that they could (or 
should) make autcmomous decisions. Despite this, 
some residents did so in defiance of council laws and 
in spite of fines. Similarly, many residents assumed that 
they would be advised by the authorities whether 
they should stay or go, despite people from the 
Premier down telling them that they should make 
their own decision whether to leave early or stay and 
defend their properties. The result was that many 
people waited until it was too late to make up their 
own minds. Their response is understandable, in 
that it suggests that because the system had long 
ago removed any autonomy on the part of the local 
community, in effect, 111any had given over to the 
authorities to manage their affairs. 
The 2006 US Government investigation into the 
government response to the Hurricane Katrina disaster, 
found that despite a National Response Plan (NRP), 
a National Incident Management System (NIMS), an 
Interim National Infrastructure Protection Plan (JNIPP) 
and an Interim National Preparedness Goal (INPG)~all 
created after the September 11 attacks~a declaration 
of an Incident of National Signficance (INS) was required 
before the federal bodies could respond. However, 
the report states that the, 'NRP lacked sufficient clarity 
J 
DEAKIN BUSINESS REVIEW 41 
regarding when and how an event becomes an INS: and 
ultimately, when an INS was declared, it had become 
too late to save a large proportion of the population. 
The report also argued that the creation of all of 
these systems made it difficult for authorities to be 
flexible in their response to the disaster and, among 
its 125 recommendations, recommended that local 
authorities be given more autonomy to initially declare 
events an INS {or something similar) and circumvent 
the convoluted bureaucratic process required to 
ask for assistance. It recommended that better 
communication needed to be established between 
each of the bodies responsible for these systems, 
arguing that an all-encompassing communication 
system should be developed-another system to 
manage the systems. 
Many trace the collapse of the world economy to the 
US sub-prime crisis and a false belief that it would 
self-correct. In an article published in the Boston 
Globe on June 8 2007, for example, it was reported 
that according to regulators, 'it would be a mistake 
to overreact to a market that is already showing signs 
of self-correcting at a time when little evidence has 
emerged that the broader economy is at risk'. At a 
broader level, however, the current global financial 
crisis is a result of the laissez fa ire (literally, let do) 
system of allowing the market to be the only arbiter 
of global economic policy, based around a theoretical 
concept of the maximisation of economic utility. 
Ultimately, the size of the collapse is simply because 
one system-neo-liberalism-became so powerful 
that it existed only for the sake ofthe system and, 
because of its perceived effectiveness, was able to 
remove all alternative perspectives from the discourse. 
The alternative stance posited by many, Australia's 
Prime Minister included, was that it was time for 
the market to be more thoroughly regulated, which 
would be just as dangerous. Of course, the sub-prime 
debacle's origins were in a range of US government 
regulation passed from the time of Reagan, Bush, 
Clinton and Bush; however, this is not the point. Any 
system, either regulated or unregulated, needs to have 
consciousness of its effect on the citizenry because, if it 
doesn't, it is simply a theory. 
Each of these events illustrate that systems, and a belief in 
the rational operation of these systems, have the ability 
to lull us into a false sense of security Perhaps the critical 
issue in these events is that, in each case, everybody 
assumed that the system would take care of itself and 
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solve any problems. And it is this ideology of systems and 
rationality that has brought about this willingness ;0oong 
the broader citizenry to disconnect from the complexity 
of existence in contemporary society and allow tl-)e 
system to take care of them. The problem is that fhe 
system does not care about complexity, difference and 
compromise-it is a construct built around efficiency-
and the system makes decisions that are best for the 
system, rather than the citizen. 
But there are clear historical precedents. The Age of 
Enlightenment (or Age of Rationalism) came about as 
a rejection of the divine right of kings and a rebellion 
against the orthodoxy and dominance of religious 
authority as the controlling force in life. To some degree, 
it brought about a collapse (or reduced influence) 
in these traditional institutions and led to both the 
French and American revolutions and subsequent 
republics. At its core was a critical questioning of 
traditional institutions, customs and morals, largely 
·because of their failure to protect ordinary citizens, 
and partly because ordinary citizens believed (falsely) 
that these institutions would protect them. At this 
time} the intellectual and philosophical developments 
aspired towards rational discourse, personal judgment, 
liberalism and the scientific method. And, to some 
degree, this was very much an enlightened perspective. 
What the rationalists were rejecting was simply another 
system-religion-which had, and still has, the 
potential to be just as circuitous, self supporting and 
pernicious as any management or scientific system. 
In effect, this shift morphed into a variety of 20th 
century movements and ideological beliefs. The faith 
in rationality, systems (including the pre-eminence 
of the market as a means of governing the flow of 
capital), government as protector and neo-liberalism, 
are all artefacts of the Age of Enlightenment. 
However, the underlying foundations of the Age 
of Enlightenment have been debased by modern 
interpretations of rationalism and systems based 
around efficiency and short-term gain, rather than the 
acceptance of curiosity, creativity and scepticism as a 
means of furthering society. 
The major issue here is that any system, whether it is a 
religious system, a monarchical system, an institution, 
or an ideological system works on a principle of what 
Gideon Haigh refers to as 'near-rightness'-it works 
okay as long as nothing out of the ordinary occurs. 
Once we give over to that system, it is restricted by 
its structure and by a false belief in its self-correcting 
ability. Sadly, a syster-n doesn't have the faculty of 
consciousness nor creativity, so when something goes 
wrong that doesn't fit into the system; it is slow to 
respond·- -if, indeed, it can respond. 
In a systern, no individual can take responsibility 
because the structure of the system removes the 
ability of individuals to make judgments without 
forcing them to conform to a structure pre-determined 
by the system-it is a cyclical dilemma, a Catch-22. 
What happened at Sydney airport, what happened 
in Victoria and what happened on Wall Street 
show that if we place too much faith in systems, 
we will never be able to respond appropriately to 
extraordinary events. This is because systems and 
contemporary interpretations of rationality are based 
upon a foundation of reductionism and efficiency. 
These events show that a system can only respond to 
something it has been programmed to respond to. In 
other words, a system can't think for itself The process 
of thinking requires feeling, and rationality aims to 
remove feeling from decision making. 
In no way am I suggesting that we should not have 
rules, laws and regulations to control and maintain 
appropriate behaviour. Nor am I suggesting that we 
should not have boundaries, policies and processes 
in business and in society. Boundaries are just as 
important as freedoms when developing ideas. There 
is an issue of balance, however, and at present, the 
pendulum has swung too far towards managerial 
systems thinkin9, particularly in domains that are 
not purely about rnanagen1ent, such as politics, the 
environment and social justice issues. This focus Is 
understandable because it is a nclturallnstlnct to seek 
simple, silver bullet responses, and rnanaqerial sygttJrm 
have the appearance of providing simple, rational and 
clearly-defined answers to many issues. 
In times of crisis, such as what we are seeing now 
in relation to both global climate changes and 
economics, many of these rational systems must be 
ignored, or ten1porarily put aside as a means to get 
thin9s 1novin9 quickly. What we need to recognise 
is that any systc'rn, any institution, any structure 
has its wcilk poillls, and there is a compelling and 
imrnedidtt' nec~d to rc>situate creativity, an openness 
to con1plt'Xity, ill1d individual autonomy and 
responsibility Into tlwsc structures. 
Epilogue 
Having recently done a bit of fiying, I came to 
realise that 'near-rightness' is simply not an 6ption 
when it comes to piloting a commercial aeroplane 
For a situation that throws up a great amqunt of 
opportunities for massive failure, the airline industry 
makes few mistakes, and when it does, it spends a 
large proportion of resources to discover how and 
why. What I did realise is that the piloting of a plane 
requires the correct mix of both rational systems and 
human involvement. As a model, the way in which air 
is managed and monitored is a good one. The amount 
of resources involved in doing this is traded off against 
managing the major risks involved in fiying a big steel 
tube through the air. 
A false sense of security-Dr Paul Harrison Is a senlqr lecturer in marketing 
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